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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Minnesota corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
oooOooo 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 14109 
NATURE OF CASE 
Continental Bank & Trust Company brought an action 
as the insured against St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Company, Continental's insurer, under a banker's blanket 
bond for payments made by Continental in settlement of 
claims against it and for its attorney's fees and costs. 
Continental also claimed reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs in prosecution of the action against St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Insurance Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 24, 1975, the Third Judicial District 
Court, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 
plaintiff's complaint (R. 23-4). On May 12, 1975, the 
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District Court denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend 
judgment or for relief from judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Company, prays the summary judgment be affirmed and that 
respondent be awarded its costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The action of Continental Bank & Trust Company 
(hereinafter "Continental") is based upon a banker's blanket 
bond issued by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company 
(hereinafter "St. Paul"). Continental claims that the costs 
of its defense and subsequent settlement of Clark Tank Lines 
Company, Inc. and Service Tank Lines, Inc. v. Continental 
Bank & Trust Co., Civil Action No. 199003, in the Third 
Judicial District for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, are 
covered by the bond, and that St. Paul is thus liable for 
indemnification of such costs. 
The second amended complaint of Clark Tank Lines 
(hereinafter "Clark"), and Service Tank Lines (hereinafter 
"Service"), against Continental (Exs. 130-143), alleged as 
to Service, and as to Clark as indicated in brackets: 
"On or about February 1, 1971 [and 
February 10, 1970], J. M. Stoof presented 
to defendant (Continental) the following 
check of plaintiff Service [Clark]: 
Date: February 1, 1971 [February 10, 1970] 
Amount: $32,500 [$10,272.22] 
Payee: Continental Bank & Trust Company 
Drawee Bank: Old National Bank of Washington 
[Clearfield State Bank] (1(1(2,18) 
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"Defendant received said check and 
negotiated the same without placing its 
endorsement thereon. (1M|3,19) 
"Said check was not endorsed by J. M. 
Stoof or by any other person other than 
banks in the collection process. (1(1(4/20) 
"Said check was processed through 
normal banking channels and was paid by 
the drawee bank when presented. (1(1(5/21) 
"Defendant received the proceeds of 
said check. (1(1(6/22) 
"Defendant paid over the proceeds of 
said check to J. M. Stoof by: 
crediting the proceeds thereof to 
his personal account with defendant. (1(7) 
[and by crediting the same to per-
sonal indebtedness of J. M. Stoof to 
defendant] ." (1123) 
Clark and Service alleged against Continental as 
to each check (the emphasis is ours): 
"[1] By presenting the check for 
payment and receiving payment, defendant 
[Continental] warranted that it had good 
title to the check or was authorized to 
obtain payment on behalf of one who had 
good title, which warranty was false and 
was breached by defendant/ causing loss 
and damage to plaintiffs in the amount[s] 
of $32/500 [and $10/272.22]. (1(119 and 25) 
"[2] Defendant received said check 
and the proceeds thereof for the use and 
benefit of and on a constructive trust for 
plaintiff Service [and Clark]. Defendant 
breached said trust and failed to apply 
such check and its proceeds for the use and 
benefit of plaintiff Service [and Clark]/ 
causing loss and damage to plaintiffs in 
the amount of $32/500 [and $10/272.22]. 
(1(1(11 and 27) 
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"[3] Defendant had no right to the 
proceeds of said check and diverted the 
same to its own use to the damage of plain-
tiffs in the amount of $32,500 [and $10,272.22]. 
(1M[13 and 29) 
"[4] Defendant had the duty to obtain 
authority from plaintiff[s] Service [and 
Clark] or to inquire of plaintiff[s] Ser-
vice [and Clark] as to the application of 
said check and its proceeds. Defendant 
negligently failed to perform such duty, 
causing loss or damage to plaintiffs in 
the amount of $32,500 [and $10,272.22]. 
(1115 and 31) 
"[5] Defendant paid over the proceeds 
of said check to J. M. Stoof with actual 
knowledge that J. M. Stoof had no authority 
to receive or direct application of the pro-
ceeds thereof, or with knowledge of such 
facts that its action in this regard amounted 
to bad faith to the damage of plaintiffs in 
the amount of $32,500 [$10,272.22]. (111(17 
and 33)" 
Clark Tank Lines alleged an additional basis for 
liability against Continental: 
"Defendant (Continental) covenanted and 
agreed that in its transactions with plain-
tiff Clark that it would be bound by the pro-
visions of the resolution furnished to defen-
dant by plaintiff Clark and defendant breached 
its agreement with plaintiff Clark causing loss 
and damage to plaintiff in the amount of 
$10,272.22. (1(35)" 
The foregoing constituted various counts of the 
Clark/Service First and Second Causes of Action against 
Continental based upon the two checks of $32,500 and $10,272.22, 
respectively. Continental's complaint against St. Paul is 
based only on these two causes of action. Clark also alleged 
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claims in the Third and Fourth Causes based on two other 
checks payable to Clark, as to which checks Continental 
makes no claim against St. Paul. 
Clark and Service also alleged in their Fifth 
Cause of Action that: 
"Defendant aided and abetted J. M. 
Stoof in his dealings with respect to the 
checks and transactions alleged in the 
first through fourth causes of action, 
and through its acts and omissions as 
alleged prevented plaintiffs from learning 
of the embezzlements and defalcations of 
J. M. Stoof so that plaintiffs could have 
avoided or minimized its loss from the 
wrongful acts of J. M. Stoof causing 
plaintiff general damages in the amount 
of $600,000. (1(75)" 
Authorized signatories to the Service Tank Lines 
check signed the check in blank and delivered it to J. M. 
Stoof who completed the check by inserting the date, amount 
and payee of the check and deposited it with Continental, 
which Continental applied to his personal account (R. 17). 
The Clark Tank Lines check in the amount of 
$10,272.22 was signed by B. Robert Clark, president of Clark 
Tank Lines, in blank. Stoof subsequently filled in the 
amount and date of the check and deposited the check with 
Continental, which Continental applied to his personal 
account (R. 17). 
Clark Tank Lines had a practice of issuing its 
corporate checks to the order of Continental for the purpose 
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of payment on personal loans or notes of Clark's officers. 
Continental admitted: (1) Check No. 2376 dated February 10, 
1970, payable to Continental in the amount of $1,000, signed 
by J. Moroni Stoof and M. J. Whitear, was applied to a note 
in the name of Douglas Boulden and to a note in the name of 
Boyce R. Clark, in the amount of $500 each; (2) Check No. C-
35588, dated February 13, 1970, payable to Continental in 
the amount of $5,000, signed by J. Moroni Stoof and M. J. 
Whitear, applied to a note in the name of Boyce R. Clark; 
(3) Check No. 35889, dated February 13, 1970, in the amount 
of $5,000, signed by J. Moroni Stoof and M. J. Whitear, 
applied to a note in the name of Douglas L. Boulden; (4) 
Check No. 1989, dated March 20, 1969, payable to Continental 
in the amount of $106.25, signed by J. Moroni Stoof and 
B. Robert Clark, applied to a note in the name of Douglas L. 
Boulden; (5) Check No. C-36133, dated December 15, 1970, 
payable to Continental in the amount of $51,071.24, signed 
by A. L. Murdock and C. B. Maddis, applied $15,138.96 to a 
note in the name of Boyce R. Clark, $15,138.96 to a note in 
the name of Douglas L. Boulden, the remainder applied to a 
note in the name of Clark Tank Lines, Inc. (Defendant's 
Answers to Interrogatories, Exs. 60, 61). 
Continental, in the Service/Clark action, admitted: 
"J. Moroni Stoof had authority to sign 
checks on behalf of Clark Tank Lines. The 
fact that Mr. Stoof had authority to sign 
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the checks and regularly dealt with the 
bank in connection with the Clark Tank 
Lines account was known to Russell Butler, 
then manager of the South Temple Branch 
and also to tellers and to all bookkeep-
ing personnel having access to signature 
card files. In addition, Mr. B. Robert 
Clark introduced Mr. Stoof to Mr. Butler 
and instructed Mr. Butler that Mr. Stoof 
had full authority to act for Clark Tank 
Lines in financial matters." (Defendant's 
Answers to Interrogatories, Ex. 64.) 
Continental has admitted that there were no irre-
gularities in the Clark or Service checks and that each 
check was accepted and processed in the ordinary course of 
business. (Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories, Ex. 65.) 
In addition, Continental admitted it had no knowledge of (1) 
how Stoof obtained and materially altered the Service and 
Clark checks, (2) persons who acted upon Continental's 
behalf in bad faith, (3) employees of Continental who con-
verted funds to or that funds were converted to Continen-
tal' s own use, (4) employees of Continental who were dis-
honest, fraudulent or committed criminal acts, (5) employees 
of Continental who aided and abetted in an embezzlement, or 
(6) of persons who have knowledge that the Clark and Service 
checks were signed in blank or were obtained, completed or 
materially altered without authorization through fraudulent 
misrepresentation by J. Moroni Stoof (R. 37-38). 
Continental was insured by a banker's blanket bond 
issued by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company. The 
bond states: 
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"The St. Paul Fire and Marine In-
surance Company . . . in consideration 
of agreed premiums and subject to these 
Declarations and the General Conditions 
of this Bond and the terms and limitations 
expressed in its Insuring Clauses agrees 
to indemnify the Insured . . . from and 
against any losses sustained by the In-
sured as the result of any of the occur-
rences or events mentioned in the Bond . . . ." 
(R. 62.) 
Insuring Clause (A) , entitled, "Dishonesty," 
provides: 
"The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the 
Insured to any amount not exceeding the amount 
stated in the Declaration for this Insuring 
Clause, or endorsement amendatory thereto, 
from and against any loss or any loss of 
Property, brought by reason of any dishonest, 
fraudulent or criminal act of any of the 
Employees, wherever committed and whether 
acting alone or in collusion with others . . . ." 
(R. 66.) 
Insuring Clause (D) of the bond provides: 
"The Underwriter [St. Paul] agrees to 
indemnify the Insured to any amount not 
exceeding the amount stated in the Declara-
tions for this Insuring Clause, or endorse-
ment amendatory thereto, from and against 
any loss through FORGERY OR ALTERATION of, 
on or in any checks . . . ." (R. 67) 
The bond also provides: 
"The Underwriter will indemnify the 
Insured against court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred and paid by the 
Insured in defending any suit or legal 
proceeding brought against the Insured 
to enforce the Insured's liability or al-
leged liability on account of any loss, 
claim or damage which, if established 
against the Insured would constitute a 
valid and collectible loss sustained by 
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the Insured under the terms of this bond. 
Such indemnity shall be in addition to 
the amount otherwise recoverable under 
this bond . . . ." (R. 64) 
Continental alleges in its complaint against St. 
Paul that it expended $13,330.91 in attorney's fees and 
costs in defense of the claims of Clark Tank Lines and 
Service Tank Lines, and paid Clark Tank Lines and Service 
Tank Lines $15,600 in settlement of the claims against 
Continental. On January 19, 1973, Continental commenced the 
present legal action against St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Company for indemnification of said amounts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ST. PAUL IS NOT LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES SINCE 
ST. PAUL HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND CONTINENTAL 
A. The Duty to Defend is Determined by the Allega-
tions of the Complaint in the Clark/Service v. 
Continental Action. 
Continental's claim is based upon its alleged loss 
through forgery or alteration of checks or by reason of a 
dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any of its employees. 
However, to determine whether St. Paul had a duty to defend 
Continental, the allegations of the Clark and Service Tank 
Lines complaints must be considered. Continental must show 
that Clark's complaint alleged liability covered by the 
bond. Facts outside of the allegations of the complaint 
cannot constitute the basis of a duty to defend. 
- l o -
st. Paul's duty to defend Continental in the Clark 
Tank Lines and Service Tank Lines v. Continental matter is 
dependent upon the allegations in the complaint against the 
insured. Such allegations of the Clark Tank Lines and 
Service Tank Lines v. Continental complaint determine whether 
there is a claim within the coverage of the policy and, 
thus, a duty to defend. McAlear v. Saint Paul Insurance 
Companies, 493 P.2d 331 (Mont. 1972); see also Brown v. Green, 
466 P.2d 299 (Kan. 1970); City of Burns v. Northwestern Mutual 
Ins. Co., 434 P.2d 465 (Ore. 1967); McKee v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 426 P.2d 456 (Ore. 1967); Paulin v. Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Co. , 403 P.2d 555 (Ariz.App. 1965); Remitter v. Glens Falls 
Indemnity Co., 295 P.2d 19 (Cal.App. 1956); Leonard v. 
Maryland Casualty Co., 146 P.2d 378 (Kan. 1944). 
The complaint of a third party against an insured 
must state a claim within the policy coverage before an 
insurer is obligated or liable to undertake the defense or 
to pay for the expenses incurred in defense of an action. 
The rule is stated at 14 Couch on Insurance 2d, §51:41, page 
534, as follows: 
"A liability insurer has no duty to 
defend a suit brought by a third party 
against the insured where the petition 
or complaint in such suit upon its face 
alleges a state of facts which fails to 
bring the case within the coverage of the 
policy. Consequently, the insurer is not 
required to defend if it would not be 
bound to indemnify the insured even though 
the claim against him should prevail in 
that action." (Footnote omitted.) 
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The burden is upon the insured in an action on an indemnity 
policy to show that loss suffered comes within terms of 
policy, Waite v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 467 
P.2d 847 (Wash. 1970); City of Burns v. Northwestern Mutual 
Ins. Co., 434 P.2d 465 (Ore. 1967). The allegations of 
Clark Tank Lines and Service Tank Lines in their action 
against Continental must be within the policy coverage 
before St. Paul has any duty to defend under the blanket 
banker's bond. 
This Court, on at least two occasions, has indi-
cated its support of the principal that the allegations of 
the third party against the insured must be within the 
coverage of the bond before the insurer has a duty to defend. 
In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Kay, 26 U.2d 
195, 487 P.2d 852 (1971), the insurer brought a declaratory 
judgment action to determine its liability and duty to 
defend its insured. The trial court held that since the 
insurer had assumed the defense, it could not deny coverage 
because to do so would prejudice the insured. This Court 
reversed, holding that the insurer, in declining to continue 
its defense, by notifying the insured sufficiently in ad-
vance to prepare a defense, and by bringing the declaratory 
judgment action did not prejudice the insured* In reaching 
its decision, the Court stated: 
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11
 [W] here the facts alleged in a complaint 
against the insured support a recovery for 
an occurrence covered by the policy, even 
though the insurer has knowledge that the 
injury is not in fact so covered, it is the 
insurer's duty to defend, unless relief is 
obtained by way of a declaratory judgment." 
26 U.2d at 199. (Footnote omitted; empha-
sis added.) 
The insurer initiated the declaratory judgment action be-
cause the facts alleged in the third party complaint were 
within the policy coverage and the insurer thus on the face 
of it might have been required to defend, but when in fact 
the injury was not covered because of a policy exclusion, 
the declaratory judgment procedure was followed by the 
insurer to establish there was no duty to defend. The point 
of the Kay case is that one must look initially to the facts 
alleged in the third party complaint to determine whether 
the insurer has any duty to defend under the policy. 
In Rasmussen v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 
15 U.2d 333, 393 P.2d 376 (1964), the insured brought a 
declaratory judgment action to determine his rights under 
the insurance policy. The trial court found the insurer 
obligated to defend the insured in the action against him. 
This Court affirmed and stated: 
"Coverage B—'Property Damage Lia-
bility—Automobile'—protects the named 
insured as to damages 'caused by accident 
and arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use of any automobile.' The 
only qualifications of Coverage B, appli-
cable to the instant case, are that the 
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named insured have the use of the automo-
bile involved and be held liable therefor. 
The complaint in the negligence action 
pending against plaintiffs alleges such 
control by C. Wesley Rasmussen as would 
make his use of the automobile within the 
purview of Coverage B. If these allega-
tions are ultimately proved, so that his 
liability is predicated on his use or con-
trol of the vehicle, he is protected under 
this coverage. 
"The appellant argues that in no 
event could Wesley be held liable in 
damages for the accident; this conten-
tion evades the question of coverage. 
The issue before this court does not 
involve any determination of liability 
but the protection extended by the insur-
ance contract." 15 U.2d at 335. (Empha-
sis added.) 
The allegations of the complaint against the insured, not 
his ultimate liability/ were found to determine the insurer's 
duty to defend. The allegations were within policy coverage 
and the insurer required to defend. Conversely, if the 
allegations of the third party against the insured are not 
within policy coverage, the insurer has no duty to defend. 
B. The Allegations of the Third Party Complaint Are 
Not Within the Coverage of the Bond. 
The allegations of the Clark Tank Lines and Ser-
vice Tank Lines complaint do not state a claim within the 
banker's blanket bond. The Service and Clark Tank Lines 
complaints alleged that each of two checks, each drawn on 
banks other than Continental, were presented by J. M. Stoof, 
each was processed through normal banking channels without 
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Continental's endorsement, each check was paid and Conti-
nental received payment and credited the amount to Stoof's 
personal account or his indebtedness to Continental. As a 
result of these facts, Service and Clark claimed (1) Conti-
nental breached its warranty of title (11119, 25; Exs. 132, 
134), (2) Continental breached its constructive trust to 
Service and Clark (111111, 27; Exs. 133, 135), (3) Continental 
converted the proceeds of the checks to its own use (111(13, 
29; Exs. 133, 135), (4) Continental was negligent in failing 
to obtain authority from Service and Clark or inquiring as 
to the application of the checks and their proceeds (111(15, 
31; Exs. 133, 135), (5) Continental paid the proceeds to 
J. M. Stoof with actual knowledge that J. M. Stoof lacked 
authority or under circumstances constituting bad faith 
(1(1(17, 33; Exs. 133, 135), and (6) Continental aided and 
abetted J. M. Stoof in connection with all the checks and 
transactions alleged among the defendant banks, preventing 
Clark and Service from learning of Stoof's actions (1(75; Ex. 
142). In addition, Clark alleged Continental breached its 
agreement in not abiding with the corporate resolution 
furnished to Continental. The allegations of the Clark and 
Service Tank Lines complaints in no way allege forgery or 
alteration of checks, nor dishonesty of Continental's em-
ployees, the alleged basis of Continental's claim as set 
forth in its complaint against St. Paul. 
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Even the Statement of Facts of Continental in its 
Brief on Appeal indicates that the allegations of Clark and 
Service Tank Lines are not within the coverage of the bond. 
Continental's Statement of Facts in connection with the 
Clark and Service Tank Lines complaint, that J. M. Stoof 
presented two checks to Continental, states: 
"With respect to each such check, 
plaintiffs alleged that the bank wrong-
fully paid or credited the proceeds of 
the check to J. M. Stoof, converted the 
check to its own use, had actual know-
ledge that J. M. Stoof had no authority 
to receive the proceeds of the check and 
credited the checks to J. M. Stoof in 
bad faith. . . . In the fifth cause 
of action plaintiffs alleged that the 
bank aided and abetted J. M. Stoof in 
his dealings with respect to said checks 
and transactions and through its acts 
and omissions prevented plaintiff from 
learning of the embezzlements and defal-
cations of J. M. Stoof so that plaintiff 
could have avoided or minimized their 
losses from the wrongful acts of J. M. 
Stoof. (Emphasis added.) 
Nowhere is there an allegation by Service or Clark Tank 
Lines against Continental that their claims were based upon 
or caused by a forgery or alteration of a check or by reason 
of a dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of an employee of 
Continental. Rather, Continental has characterized the 
Clark/Service allegations in an attempt to bring the Clark/ 
Service complaint within the coverage of the bond when in 
fact the Clark/Service complaint made no such allegations. 
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C. Continental's Potential or Alleged Liability to 
Clark Tank Lines and Service Tank Lines Was Not 
Covered by the Bond. 
As discussed in Point I.A above, the allegations 
of the third party complaint determine the duty to defend. 
Facts revealed during the course of discovery do not change 
the principle that the allegations of the complaint against 
the insured must be within the coverage of the policy before 
there is a duty to defend. Nevertheless, Continental's 
description of the facts in its brief describes the results 
of Continental's discovery in the Clark and Service Tank 
Lines action. Elsewhere in the brief, Continental relies 
upon the facts as discovered in the Service and Clark Tank 
Lines action to support its claim against St. Paul. See 
Brief of Appellant, §1.A, pp. 9-10, §1.C, p. 17, §1.E, p. 
22, and §2, p. 25. Continental attempts to ignore the 
pleadings of the Clark and Service Tank Lines complaint and 
relies upon facts discovered in the course of the litigation 
of that action. However, St. Paul's duty to defend is based 
only upon the complaint of Clark and Service Tank Lines and 
not upon such facts as may have been discovered by Conti-
nental during the course of the litigation. 
In Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of America, 
377 P.2d 26 (Ore. 1962), an action to recover damages for 
the alleged breach of a contract of insurance where the 
insurer declined the defense of an assault and battery 
action, the Court held: 
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"In accordance with the weight of 
authority, we have held that the obliga-
tion of the insurer to defend is to be 
determined by the allegations of the com-
plaint filed against the insured, we 
adhere to this view. The insurer con-
tracts to indemnify the insured within 
certain limits stated in the policy. 
If the facts alleged in the complaint 
against the insured do not fall within 
the coverage of the policy, the insurer 
should not have the obligation to defend. 
If a contrary rule were adopted, requiring 
the insurer to take note of facts other 
than those alleged, the insurer frequently 
would be required to speculate upon whether 
the facts alleged could be proved. We do 
not think that this is a reasonable inter-
pretation of the bargain to defend. It is 
more reasonable to assume that the parties 
bargained for the insurer's participation 
in the lawsuit only if the action brought 
by the third party, if successful, would 
impose liability upon the insurer to indem-
nify the insured." 
It is irrelevant that the insured or the insurer 
may have other information or facts besides those alleged in 
the complaint. In Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Insurance Co., 
460 P.2d 342 (Ore. 1968), the Court cited Isenhart, supra, 
and stated: 
"The insurer's knowledge of facts not 
alleged in the complaint is irrelevant in 
determining the existence of the duty to 
defend and consequently the insurer need 
not speculate as to what the 'actual facts' 
of the alleged occurrence may be." (Footnote 
omitted.) 460 P.2d 346. 
In United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. 
Ins. Co., 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950), the insurance 
policy covered premises used for the retail sale of clothing 
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or wearing apparel. The insured began handling stoves, 
heaters, refrigerators, butane gas appliances and propane 
gas. A fire was caused by a defective gas container, re-
sulting in extensive damage to the insured building and 
adjoining premises. A declaratory judgment action was 
brought by the insured to determine liability of the insurer 
under the policy. The Court on appeal, construing Utah law, 
reversed the trial's court's finding of policy coverage and 
held that only damages resulting from the operation of a 
retail sports store, selling clothing or wearing apparel, 
was within policy coverage. On the point of attorney's 
fees, the Court held that none were owed the insured by the 
insurer, where the loss is not within policy coverage, and 
stated: 
"The rule is that under such provi-
sions, the company is bound to defend only 
suits alleging a cause of action which brings 
the case within the coverage of the policy. 
The company is not bound to defend any action 
not falling within the coverage of the policy." 
(Footnote omitted.) 
In Midland Const. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 
214 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954), the Court held that a con-
struction company's alleged liability was not within the 
coverage of the insurance policy. As to the insurer's duty 
to defend, the Court stated: 
"Although the policy required the 
casualty company to defend suits brought 
against the insured, even if such suit 
is groundless, false or fraudulent, it 
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is the law that where the complaint fails 
to allege facts which, if established, 
create liability within the policy, no 
duty rests upon the insurance company 
to defend the action or pay a judgment 
obtained therein." (Footnote omitted.) 
214 F.2d 667. 
See also Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mason-Moore-Tracy, Inc., 
194 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1952); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 
v. Reinhart & Donovan Co., 171 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1948). 
Where there is a conflict between the allegations 
of the third party complaint and the known or ascertainable 
facts, there is a split of authority regarding the duty to 
defend. The annotation, "Allegations in Third Person's 
Actions Against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer's 
Duty to Defend," 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956), cites the following 
jurisdictions as holding that the insurer may look exclu-
sively to the allegations of the complaint: California, 
District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina. 50 A.L.R.2d at 498. 
The following jurisdictions are cited as following the rule 
that actual facts within the knowledge of the insurer are 
determinative: Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Texas. Even under the theory that facts are determinative, 
the known or knowable facts must create at least the poten-
tial for liability within the coverage of the insuring 
policy before the insurer has the duty to defend. As seen 
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in the discussion of Point III of this Brief, Continental 
was not liable even under the known or knowable facts• In 
addition, the bond itself supports the rule that the alle-
gations are determinative, where it provides that the in-
surer will indemnify the insured against costs and reason-
able attorney's fees incurred 
"in defending any suit or legal proceeding 
brought against the Insured to enforce the 
Insured's liability or alleged liability on 
account of any loss, claim or damage which, 
if established against the Insured would 
constitute a valid and collectible loss 
sustained by the Insured under the terms 
of this bond." (R. 64.) 
If the allegations of the complaint are not within the 
coverage of the bond, there can be no "liability or alleged 
liability . . . which . . . would constitute a valid and 
collectible loss sustained by the Insured under the terms of 
this bond." Thus, the allegations, not the known or know-
able facts, are properly determinative. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure concerning require-
ments of a complaint are instructive as to the interpre-
tation which must be given the Clark/Service complaint. 
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in part: 
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall 
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This Court 
has construed that rule to mean that "the basic facts must 
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be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what 
facts are claimed to constitute such charges." Heathman v. 
Hatch, 13 U.2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 (1962). 
St. Paul is entitled to rely upon the allegations 
of the Clark/Service complaint as constituting the claims 
against Continental. If the complaint is not specific 
enough, a party may request a more definite statement under 
Rule 12(e) or may move to dismiss if the plaintiff would be 
entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could 
be proved in support of the claim. Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 
U.2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955). But St. Paul is not required 
to go beyond the face of the complaint, to speculate as to 
the "true facts," or to speculate as to what action on the 
part of Continental may give rise to liability within the 
bond coverage if not stated in the complaint. Specifically, 
the bond provides that the complaint must be considered in 
determining the duty to defend where the bond states: 
"The Underwriter will indemnify the 
Insured against court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred and paid by In-
sured in defending any suit or legal pro-
ceeding brought against the Insured to 
enforce the Insured's liability or alleged 
liability on account of any loss, claim or 
damage which, if established against the 
Insured, would constitute a valid and col-
lectible loss sustained by the Insured 
under the terms of this bond." (Empha-
sis added.) 
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The bond, providing protection for "alleged liability . . . 
which, if established would constitute a valid . . . loss 
. . . under the terms of this bond," requires that the 
complaint be controlling as to the issue whether the alleged 
loss is within the coverage of the bond. A defendant's 
alleged liability is not determined by extrinsic or unpleaded 
facts. If newly discovered facts give rise to additional 
bases of liability or reveal previously pleaded facts to be 
erroneous or inaccurate, a complaint may be amended. See 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This is why the 
Second Amended Complaint of Clark and Service is the opera-
tive complaint. 
Simple examination of the Clark/Service complaint 
reveals no allegation or statement of fact that there was 
any alteration or forgery of the checks involved or that an 
employee of Continental committed any dishonest, fraudulent 
or criminal act in dealing with or processing the check. On 
the contrary, the complaint says "said check was processed 
through normal banking channels and was paid by the drawee 
bank when presented." 
The Clark/Service complaint is similar to the com-
plaint considered by this Court in Heathman v. Hatch, 13 
U.2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 (1962). In that case, the plaintiff 
sued the defendant, an attorney, for alleged wrongs arising 
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from the defendant's representation of plaintiff. The 
defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaintf which 
motion was granted. In considering the plaintiff's appeal, 
Justice Crockett, for the Court, stated: 
"[T]he nature of the grievances which the 
plaintiff complains about is that the 
defendant was guilty of 'fraud,' 'con-
spiracy, ' and negligence': (1) in repre-
senting the plaintiff in connection with 
the criminal charges; (2) in failing to 
enforce his 'possessory lien1 against 
the automobile and parts which he was 
accused of stealing; and (3) in failing 
to sue the complaining witness, Ivan 
Bland, and others, for filing and pro-
secuting the criminal charge. It is to 
be noted that the terms 'fraud,' 'con-
spiracy' and 'negligence' are but general 
accusations in the nature of conclusions 
of the pleader. They will not stand up 
against a motion to dismiss on that ground. 
The basic facts must be set forth with suf-
ficient particularity to show what facts 
are claimed to constitute such charges." 
The Clark/Service complaint sets out certain facts concern-
ing Continental's receipt and processing of the checks and 
in the various counts within each cause of action alleges 
liability for breach of warranty of title, breach of con-
structive trust, conversion, negligence, knowledge of lack 
of authority or bad faith, breach of contract, and aiding 
and abetting. No additional facts are alleged in the var-
ious counts of each cause of action. Rather, the only facts 
alleged are as to the presentation of the checks to Conti-
nental and Continental's processing of the checks. This 
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process of alleging several and alternative bases of en-
titlement to relief is authorized by Rule 8 (a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure: "Relief in the alternative or of sev-
eral different types may be demanded." 
The duty of St. Paul to defend, if any, must be 
determined from examination of the facts as alleged by Clark 
and Service. Such facts are that J. M. Stoof presented, at 
different times, two checks to Continental, each drawn on 
another bank, that each check was processed through normal 
banking channels without Continental's endorsement and paid 
by the drawee bank; Continental received payment and cred-
ited the amount to Stoofs personal account or his indebted-
ness to Continental. There is no allegation that the check 
was altered or forged. There is no allegation that any 
employee of Continental committed any dishonest, fraudulent 
or criminal act. 
On the face of the complaint, it is clear that St. 
Paul had no duty to defend Continental. The allegations of 
the Clark/Service complaint were not within the coverage of 
the bond. The Clark/Service complaint was before the trial 
court, and whether the allegations of the Clark/Service com-
plaint were within bond coverage is a question of law. 
Continental cannot, ex post facto, look to facts beyond the 
complaint which, had they been pleaded in the Clark com-
plaint, would have brought the Clark allegations within the 
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coverage of the bond, resulting in St. Paul's duty to defend. 
Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of America, supra; Ferguson 
v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., supra. The trial court's award 
of judgment to St. Paul was correct, there being no issues 
of material fact, and St. Paul is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
POINT II 
FOR AN INSURER TO BE LIABLE TO PAY FOR A 
SETTLEMENT MADE BY THE INSURED, THE CLAIM WHICH 
IS MADE AGAINST THE INSURED MUST BE WITHIN THE 
POLICY COVERAGE 
A. Where the Insurer Justifiably Refuses to Defend a 
Claim Against Its Insured, It Is Not Guilty of a 
Breach of Contract and No Liability Attaches to 
Its Refusal to Defend. 
If the defense is justifiably declined, any subse-
quent settlement entered into by or judgment taken against 
the insured does not create any liability upon the insurer. 
The rule is stated in 14 Couch on Insurance 2d, §51:51, page 
544: 
"Where the insurer refuses to defend 
an action brought against the insured, 
basing its refusal on the ground that it 
is under no duty to defend, because the 
claim upon which the action against the 
insured is founded is not within the 
coverage of the policy, and it appears 
that such claim actually is outside the 
policy coverage, the refusal of the in-
surer to defend does not constitute a 
breach of contract but, on the contrary, 
is a justified refusal, and the insurer 
incurs no liability by its action." 
(Footnote omitted.) 
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In McAlear v. St, Paul Insurance Companies, 493 
P.2d 331 (Mont. 1972), the insured McAlear was sued by the 
owner of an airplane allegedly damaged by McAlearfs negli-
gence. McAlear, an attorney, had a professional liability 
policy with his insurer, St. Paul Insurance Companies, and 
tendered defense of the action to the insurer. St. Paul 
denied the tender of the defense, claiming that the policy 
afforded no coverage because injury to or destruction of 
tangible property, including the loss of use thereof, was 
specifically excluded from the policy. The Court held that 
the allegations in the complaint against the insured deter-
mine whether there is coverage under the policy, and since 
the complaint against the insured was outside the scope of 
the policy, there was no duty to defend and no liability of 
the insurer to pay the claim made against the insured. 
In MacDonald v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 
311 P.2d 425 (Ore. 1957), the insured brought an action 
against his insurer for failure to undertake the defense of 
a criminal assault and battery action and for a civil assault 
and battery action, arising out of the same altercation. 
The insurer denied coverage and declined the tender of the 
defense, whereafter the insured settled the civil action 
and, with the assistance of legal counsel, was successful in 
having the criminal complaint dismissed. The insured insti-
tuted the action against the insurer for attorney's fees and 
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costs incurred in defending the actions, and for the amount 
paid in settlement of the civil action. The Court held that 
where the policy excluded injury caused intentionally by or 
at the direction of the insured, that the insurer had no 
duty to defend and was not liable for the amount for which 
the insured settled the civil action. In reaching its 
decision, the Court stated: 
"Such an action was outside the 
general coverage of the policy whether 
it was a valid claim or was false and 
fraudulent. Defendant had no duty to 
defend. The settlement made with the 
plaintiffs in the assault action was 
also for an injury not covered by the 
policy. The defendant United Pacific 
Insurance Company is not liable either 
for failing to defend or for refusing 
to pay the amount paid by plaintiff in 
settlement. Plaintiff argues at great 
length that the insured should have the 
opportunity to present his case in 
court when he alleges that third party 
suits are false and fraudulent. We 
agree that if a suit is brought against 
the insured alleging acts which are 
within the coverage of the policy, the 
insurer must defend, whether the suits 
are or are not false and fraudulent. 
But this is not such a case." 
The case at bar is very similar to the MacDonald 
case in that issues presented for decision by the trial 
court are identical: (1) Was the defendant under a duty to 
assume the defense of the plaintiff; and (2) was it under a 
duty to pay to plaintiff the amounts paid by plaintiff in 
settlement of the suits? Because the allegations of the 
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complaint against Continental are not within the coverage of 
the banker's bond, St. Paul, like the insurer in MacDonald, 
had no duty to assume the defense of Continental and had no 
duty to pay the amount paid by the insurer in settlement of 
the suit. See Cagle v. Home Insurance Co., 483 P.2d 592 
(Ariz.App. 1971). 
The MacDonald case is additionally similar to the 
case at bar. In MacDonald the insured asserted his inno-
cence upon the various charges of assault and battery and 
alleged the insurer "knew that he had a valid defense 'in 
that he was protecting his property and person.'" He also 
claimed the insurer knew that any injuries inflicted by him, 
if any, were accidental and unintentional, and the insurer 
was thus obligated to defend. Negligent or intentional 
bodily injury was within policy coverage. Nonetheless, the 
allegations of the third party complaints, being outside the 
scope of coverage, the insurer had no liability for the 
insured's settlements or costs of defense and was granted 
summary judgment. Similarly, in claiming against St. Paul 
that the loss was within bond coverage, Continental can at 
best only theorize that Clark's loss could have been caused 
by a dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of an employee, 
by forgery, or by alteration. However, because Clark did 
not allege such cause or causes of loss, the trial court 
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properly held St. Paul entitled to summary judgment. 
Similarly, in Isaacson Iron Works v. Ocean Acci-
dent & Guar. Corp., 70 P.2d 1026 (Wash. 1937), the insured, 
a subcontractor, had been sued by the general contractor, 
had tendered the defense to the insurer, which declined the 
defense, and a judgment was taken against the insured. The 
Court, stating "the burden rested upon [insured] to show 
that the loss which it suffered comes within the terms of 
the policy" held that the claim was not covered by the 
policy and the insurer was not responsible for the insurer's 
expenses in defending the prior suit. See also Waite v. 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 467 P.2d 847 (Wash. 
1970). 
In Zipperer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Co., 254 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1958), an action was brought by 
a passenger in an automobile against the owner. Judgment 
was rendered in favor of the passenger, and the passenger 
caused a writ of garnishment to be issued against the insur-
ance company as garnishee, claiming the owner's insurer was 
obligated under the terms of the policy contract to pay the 
amount of the judgment. The garnishment action was removed 
to the federal court, where summary judgment was granted in 
favor of the garnishee insurance company. On appeal, the 
Court affirmed the district court decision and stated: 
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"All the cases that we have found 
are in agreement that where the insurer 
justifiably refuses to defend on the 
grounds that the claim upon which the 
action is based is not within the coverage 
of the policy, it is not guilty of a 
breach of contract and no legal liability 
attaches to its action. Where, as here, 
the policy requires the insurer to defend 
suits brought against the insured, even 
if such suit is groundless, false or 
fraudulent, it is the law that if the 
complaint fails to allege facts which, 
if established, create liability within 
the policy, no duty rests upon the insur-
ance company to defend the action or to 
pay a judgment obtained therein." 
See also Mann v. Mann, 273 N.E.2d 40 (Ill.App. 1971). 
St. Paul is not liable to Continental for any 
settlement which Continental made with Clark and Service 
Tank Lines because the Clark/Service complaint does not 
state a claim which is within the coverage of the bond. The 
discussion of the complaint and the coverage of the bond is 
set forth in detail under Point I of this brief. In sum-
mary, where the insurer justifiably refuses to defend its 
insured, it is not guilty of a breach of contract and no 
liability attaches to its action. 
The rule is stated in 7A Appleman, Insurance Law 
and Practice, §4684, page 448: 
"Since the insurer's duty to defend ordi-
narily is correlative with its duty to pay 
a judgment which might be obtained against 
the insured, it is apparent that the insurer 
has the duty of defending only those ac-
tions that are within the terms of the policy 
- 31 -
St. Paul had no duty to defend and no duty to pay 
Continental for a judgment or settlement on a claim not 
within the policy coverage, St, Paul's refusal to defend 
was justified, and Continental suffered no loss which was 
within policy coverage. 
B. Continental, in its Brief on Appeal, Incorrectly 
States the Rules Concerning the Insurer's Lia-
bility under the Bond. 
Continental, in its Brief on Appeal, in several 
places states that its complaint against St. Paul is the 
operative document determining St. Paul's duty under the 
bond. See Point I.C, p. 17, and Point I.E, p. 22, Brief of 
Appellant. Point II of Continental's brief states: 
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR ST. 
PAUL BECAUSE THEY BANK IS ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT ON THE FACE OF THE PLEADING UNLESS 
ST. PAUL DISPUTES THE BANK'S GOOD FAITH 
IN MAKING SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST 
THE BANK711 (Emphasis added.) 
As indicated in Points I and II.A of this Brief, the third 
party complaint against the insured determines the insurer's 
duty to defend. The insured's characterization of the 
allegations of the third party complaint cannot be substi-
tuted for the third party allegations themselves. Thus, 
Continental cannot recover from St. Paul merely by charac-
terizing the Clark/Service allegations as within the bond 
coverage when the allegations are not, in fact, within the 
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coverage of the bond. The trial court was entitled to view 
the Clark/Service allegations and determine, independently 
of Continental's paraphrase or characterization of such 
allegations whether, as a matter of law, they alleged facts 
within the coverage of the bond. 
Continental asserts that its allegations are 
dispositive of all issues. However, in taking such a posi-
tion, Continental ignores the requirements of the authority 
cited above. Continental has failed to show, and cannot 
show, that the allegations of the Clark/Service complaint 
were within the coverage of the bond. The resulting settle-
ment was for claims not covered and, therefore, St. Paul is 
not liable for the cost of settlement. Continental has 
failed to cross the threshold issue: That the claims of 
Clark and Service were covered by the bond. Its inability 
to cross that threshold, as a matter of law, precludes any 
liability of St. Paul to Continental. 
Continental's brief also states: "St. Paul's only 
possible defense to the Bank's claims . . . is that the 
Bank's settlement was not in good faith." (Brief of Appel-
lant, p. 27.) Again, Continental assumes proof of a fact 
not proved and which cannot be proven because the Clark/ 
Service complaint does not allege facts within bond cover-
age. Furthermore, as indicated in Point III of this brief, 
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there is substantial question of Continental's good faith 
because under any possible theory Continental was not liable 
to Clark or Service for losses covered by the bond. 
In summary, Continental's statements of points 
cannot be taken as a correct statement of applicable law. 
It is true that a duty to defend, and liability if the duty 
is refused, are not contingent upon a finding that the 
insured in fact committed an act covered by the bond, but 
the duty ijs contingent upon the complaint against the in-
sured, not the complaint against the insurer, alleging 
liability within coverage of the insuring policy. See the 
authorities cited by Continental, such as Russ-Field Corp. 
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 330 P.2d 432 (Cal.App. 
1958), where the Court found that the claim against the 
insured was within the coverage of the policy and that the 
insurer was liable for the insured's good faith settlement. 
Also, in Lamb v. Belt Casualty Co., 40 P.2d 311 (Cal.App. 
1935), it was stated: 
"In determining whether or not the 
appellant was bound to defend, its denial 
of liability and refusal to defend, based 
upon its own investigation of the facts 
in the case, are to be disregarded. The 
language of its contract must first be 
looked to, and next the allegations of 
the complaints in each action for damages 
against the insured. The complaint clearly 
alleges damages resulting from an alleged 
negligent operation of the truck, and the 
policy in unmistakable language binds the 
insurer to defend every such action even 
though the same be groundless." (40 P.2d 
at 314; emphasis added.) 
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The Clark/Service allegations are not within the coverage of 
the bond, and St. Paul incurs no liability for Continental's 
settlement or the costs of defending the suit against Conti-
nental. 
POINT III 
THE LOSS MUST RESULT FROM A RISK WITHIN THE COVERAGE 
OF THE BOND BEFORE THE INSURER HAS ANY LIABILITY FOR A 
SETTLEMENT MADE BY ITS INSURED 
The banker's blanket bond is specific that the 
insurer's liability results from a loss sustained by the 
insured by reason of the insured occurrences, such as dis-
honesty of employees, forgery or alteration. In Insuring 
Clause A, the bond provides: "The Underwriter agrees to 
indemnify the Insured . . . from and against any loss . . . 
by reason of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of 
any of the employees . . . ." Similarly, Insuring Clause D 
of the bond provides: "The Underwriter agrees to indemnify 
the Insured . . . from and against any loss through FORGERY 
OR ALTERATION of, on or in any checks . . . ." Thus, if a 
loss is sustained from a cause other than one included in 
and covered by the banker's blanket bond, the insurer has no 
liability for its insured's loss. 
A. The Complaint Against the Insured Provides the 
Basis for Determining if the Loss is Within the 
Coverage of the Bond. 
As discussed at length in Point II of this brief, 
an insurer is not liable to its insured for a settlement 
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entered into or a judgment taken against the insured where 
the claim against the insured is not within the policy 
coverage. Similarly, no loss is sustained within the cover-
age of the bond where the complaint against the insured does 
not state a claim within the bond coverage. As discussed 
above, St. Paul had no liability to Continental because 
Continental's loss was not within coverage of the policy. 
B. The Insured Must Show That It Was or Could Have 
Been Liable for the Claim of the Third Party. 
Where a complaint against an insured fails to 
state a cause of action within the policy coverage of its 
bond, and where the insured claims the settlement was based 
upon facts as discovered during the course of the lawsuit 
which bring the loss within the terms of the policy cover-
age , the insured must be able to show some facts under which 
it might have been liable to the third party for the loss to 
be covered by the bond. It is clear, as discussed in Points 
I and II of this brief, that the complaint of Clark and 
Service Tank Lines against Continental did not state claims 
within the policy coverage of the banker's blanket bond. 
However, Continental's complaint and its argument contend that 
its loss was suffered under an insuring clause of the bond, 
Insuring Clause A or Insuring Clause D. Assuming, arguendo, 
that St. Paul must do more than stated in Points I and II of 
this brief, which Points St. Paul submits correctly state 
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the law and absolve it of any liability, Continental must 
show it was or could have been liable under the "true facts" 
of the case before St. Paul is liable. The contract of the 
surety being one of indemnity against loss requires proof of 
loss as a proximate result of a risk covered by the insuring 
contract, and absence of such proof of loss is a defense to 
the surety. Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Phoenix Nat. Bank & 
T. Co., 285 U.S. 214, 76 L.Ed. 713 (1932); Piedmont Fed. S.&L. 
Assn. v. Hartford, 307 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1962). If Conti-
nental was not or could not have been liable to Clark and 
Service Tank Lines as a matter of law for an occurrence 
within the coverage of the bond, then Continental suffered 
no insurable loss. Continental refers to this as the "good 
faith" issue, that is, if the settlement was in good faith, 
it is entitled to indemnification from St. Paul. If the 
facts, even as alleged in Continental1s complaint against 
St. Paul, do not establish any possible basis for Continen-
tal's liability or potential liability, can any settlement 
have been made in good faith? The required answer is no. 
As will be shown below, Continental could not have been 
liable to Clark or Service Tank Lines for a dishonest act of 
an employee or for alteration of a check for the following 
reasons: 
1. The record shows Continental was not liable as 
a matter of law to Service and Clark Tank Lines for an 
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occurrence within or that might have been within the cover-
age of the bond. 
Continental's Answers to St. Paul's Interroga-
tories show Continental has no knowledge of facts which 
would create liability on the part of Continental to Clark 
or Service Tank Lines, which liability would be within the 
coverage of the policy. Continental admitted, in material 
part, the following: 
"Plaintiff has no independent know-
ledge of persons who have knowledge that 
the checks alleged in the First Cause of 
Action were signed in blank or were ob-
tained, completed, or materially altered 
without authorization through fraudulent 
misrepresentation by J. Moroni Stoof. 
Plaintiffs and their attorneys in the 
action [Clark and Service Tank Lines v. 
Continental] have claimed to have such 
knowledge. 
"Plaintiff has no independent under-
standing of [how Stoof obtained and materially 
altered said checks without authorization, 
and of the fraudulent misrepresentations he 
made]. 
" . . . Plaintiff knows of no persons 
who acted upon plaintiff's behalf in bad 
faith and with actual knowledge of Stoof's 
lack of authority. 
". . . Plaintiff knows of no employees 
of plaintiff who aided and abetted in the 
embezzlement. 
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" . . . Plaintiff knows of no employees 
who converted funds to its use nor does it 
know of funds which were converted to its 
own use. 
. . . 
" . . . Plaintiff knows of no employees 
of plaintiff who were dishonest, fraudulent 
or acted or committed criminal acts in 
connection with the subject matter of this 
action." (R. 37-38) 
In its supplemental answers, Continental referred 
to depositions in the Clark/Service v. Continental lawsuit 
and "oral inquiry of . . . one of the attorneys for Clark 
Tank Lines, as to the factual basis for such allegation," of 
dishonesty (R-3). This unsupported, conclusionary hearsay 
cannot withstand Continental's sworn admissions in its 
Answers to Interrogatories, quoted above, that Continental 
knows of no employees who converted funds, who aided and 
abetted an embezzlement, or who were dishonest, fraudulent, 
or committed a criminal act. In addition, in the Clark/ 
Service action, in Answers to Interrogatories, Continental 
admitted that there were no irregularities as to the checks 
or their processing by the employees (Ex. 65). No specific 
facts were given in the Supplemental Answers in support of 
Continental's, but not Clark's, dishonesty allegation. As 
discussed below, the facts regarding alteration as set forth 
in the supplemental answers or any other facts in the Clark/ 
Service action could not result in judgment against Continental 
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as a matter of law. Obviously, the complete absence of 
facts to establish dishonesty of an employee of Continental 
is not sufficient to establish Continental's liability as a 
matter of law, to Clark, for dishonest employees, or to even 
create a genuine issue of fact as to such. 
2. The claims of Clark and Service were barred by 
their own negligence in executing the instruments. Section 
70A-3-406, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"Any person who by his negligence 
substantially contributes to a material 
alteration of the instrument or to the 
making of an unauthorized signature is 
precluded from asserting the alteration 
or lack of authority against a holder in 
due course or against a drawee or other 
payor who pays the instrument in good 
faith and in accordance with the reason-
able commercial standards of the drawee's 
or payor's business." (Emphasis added.) 
According to Continental, the checks in issue here were paid 
in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commer-
cial standards of Continental's business. In answer to 
interrogatories in the Clark/Service action, Continental 
identified no irregularity in the checks or the manner in 
which they were processed. (See plaintiff's Interrogatories 
to Defendant, No. 13, Ex. 22, and Defendant's Answers to 
Interrogatories, No. 13, Ex. 65.) In addition, J. Moroni 
Stoof had full authority to act for Clark Tank Lines in 
financial matters, and Continental admitted it so understood 
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the extent of Stoof's authority. (Defendant's Answers to 
Interrogatories, No. 10, Ex. 64.) Further, it was common 
practice for Clark corporate checks, payable to Continental, 
to be applied to personal indebtedness of officers and 
directors of Clark. (Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories, 
No. 5, Ex. 60, 61.) Thus, the checks were paid in good 
faith in accordance with Continental's reasonable commercial 
standards. 
The negligence which substantially contributed to 
a material alteration of an instrument in the present case 
is that authorized signatories of both Clark and Service 
Tank Lines signed the checks in question in blank and de-
livered them to J. M. Stoof (R. 17). That signing a check 
in blank is negligence which substantially contributes to a 
material alteration of the instrument is supported by the 
official comment to the Uniform Commercial Code, §70A-3-406, 
U.C.A. 1953, which states: 
11
 [This section] adopts the doctrine of 
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing 253 (1827), which 
held that a drawer who so negligently 
draws an instrument as to facilitate its 
material alteration is liable to a drawee 
who pays the altered instrument in good 
faith." 
In Young v. Grote, checks were signed in blank by the drawer 
and left with the drawer's wife to facilitate continuation 
cf the drawer's business in his absence. See Bailey, Brady 
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on Bank Checks, 4th Ed. 1969, §14.7, pp. 430-31; Leonard v. 
National Bank of West Virginia, 145 S.E.2d 23 (W.Va. ); 
Pacific Coast Cheese v. Security First Nat. Bank, 273 P.2d 
547 (Cal.App. 1954). In Rancho San Carlos v. Bank of Italy 
Nat. Trust & S. Ass'n, 11 P.2d 424 (Cal. 1932), the Court 
stated: 
"It is the rule that, if one signs an 
instrument containing blanks, he must intend 
it to be filled in by the person to whom it 
is delivered (Cassetta v. Beaima, 106 Cal.App. 
196, 288 Pac. 830); and where a depositor 
signs checks in blank and delivers the same 
to its agent, who fraudulently fills in the 
blanks and negotiates the checks, the drawee 
bank which pays the same without notice of 
the fraud is not liable to the drawor, since 
the negligence of the latter is the proximate 
cause of the loss." 11 P.2d at 425. (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
The official comment to the Uniform Commercial 
Code states: "Negligence usually has been found where 
spaces are left in the body of the instrument in which words 
or figures may be inserted." In U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 137 S.E.2d 582 (S.C. ), a case 
very similar to the case at bar, principal officers of the 
company signed blank checks permitting the bookkeeper to 
raise the amounts and insert names of payees, enabling her 
to embezzle the company's money. The Court held that the 
officer's negligence in executing the checks in blank and in 
failing to timely examine cancelled checks and bank state-
ments absolved the drawee bank from liability. (On the 
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issue of examination of cancelled checks and bank state-
ments, see Point III.B.3, infra.) 
Section 70A-3-406 does not create a comparative or 
contributory negligence standard available to the bank as a 
defense, but the negligence contributing to a material 
alteration precludes the assertion of alteration as against 
Continental where, as here, Continental paid the instrument 
in good faith and in accordance with its reasonable commer-
cial standards. The negligence stands as an absolute bar. 
3. Clark and Service Tank Lines had no standing 
to sue Continental: (1) any warranty of title runs to 
Continental's transferee (70A-3-417(2), U.C.A. 1953, and (2) 
an action in conversion is not available against a deposi-
tary or collecting bank by the drawer. 
Section 70A-3-417(2) provides that "any person who 
transfers an instrument and receives consideration warrants 
to his transferee, and if the transfer is by endorsement to 
any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good 
faith," against defects in the instrument or possible claims 
against the transferee or holder. The warranty runs to the 
transferee or a subsequent holder, such as the payor-drawee 
bank or other banks in the collection process; it does not 
run to the drawer of the instrument. "Holder" is defined in 
§70A-1-201(20) as "a person who is in possession of a docu-
ment entitled or an instrument or an investment security 
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drawn, issued or endorsed to him or to his order or to 
bearer or in blank." Clark and Service thus do not qualify 
as and cannot be holders. The warranties of §70A-3-417(2) 
therefore run to the banks in the collection process and not 
to the drawer. 
The rationale for the warranties only running to 
subsequent transferees or holders in a collection process is 
that the Uniform Commercial Code creates certain defenses 
which are appropriately raised by the drawee-payor bank. 
For example, §70A-4-406(1) requires the drawee-payor bank's 
customer to exercise reasonable care and promptness to 
discover an alteration and to notify the bank promptly after 
discovery. Subsection (2) of §70A-4-406 provides the conse-
quences of the customer's failure: 
"If the bank establishes that the 
customer failed with respect to an item 
to comply with the duties imposed on the 
customer by subsection (1), the customer 
is precluded from asserting against the 
bank: 
"(a) His unauthorized signature 
or any alteration on the item if the 
bank also establishes that it suffered 
a loss by reason of such failure; and 
"(b) An unauthorized signature or 
alteration by the same wrongdoer on any 
other item paid in good faith by the 
bank after the first item and statement 
was available to the customer for a 
reasonable period not exceeding 14 
calendar days and before the bank re-
ceives notification from the customer 
of any such unauthorized signature or 
alteration." 
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See Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 4th Ed. 1969, §14.8, pp. 
437-8. 
Other defenses are provided in §70A-4-406. Sub-
section (4) places a limitation period on discovery of an 
alteration of an item. It provides: 
"Without regard to care or lack of care 
of either the customer or the bank, a cus-
tomer who does not within one year from the 
time the statement and items are made 
available to the customer (subsection (1)) 
discover and report . . . any alteration 
on the face or back of the item . . . is 
precluded from asserting against the bank 
. . . such alteration." 
Finally, subsection (5) of §70A-4-406 clearly 
shows the rationale for requiring the drawor to proceed 
against the drawee-payor bank. It provides: 
"If under this section a payor bank 
has a valid defense against a claim of a 
customer upon or resulting from payment 
of an item and waives or fails upon request 
to assert the defense, the bank may not 
assert against any collecting bank or other 
prior party presenting or answering the 
item a claim based upon the unauthorized 
signature or alteration giving rise to the 
customer's claim." 
The result is similar as to the claim of Clark and 
Service Tank Lines against Continental for conversion. The 
action is properly brought against the drawee-payor bank 
rather than against Continental directly. 
In Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First 
National Bank & Trust Co. of Greenfield, 184 N.E.2d 358, 1 
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U.C.C. 195 (Mass. 1962), the Court considered the issue of a 
drawer's cause of action against a depositary bank which 
cashed checks for an individual, an employee of the plain-
tiff, who had forged the payee's endorsement on the checks, 
which were never delivered to the payee, though otherwise 
properly made and executed. The Court held that the drawer 
had no cause of action against the collecting bank which 
cashed the checks and that the drawer had no rights in the 
checks which should have been delivered to the payee. The 
Court stated: 
"The enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code opens the road for the adop-
tion of what seems the peripheral view. 
An action by the drawer against the col-
lecting bank might have some theoretical 
appeal as avoiding circuity of action. 
. . . It would have been in the interest 
of speedy and complete justice had the 
case been tried with the action by the 
drawer against the drawee and with an 
action by the drawee against the collect-
ing bank. . . . So one might ask: if 
the drawee is liable to the drawer and 
the collecting bank is liable to the 
drawee, why not let the drawer sue the 
collecting bank direct? We believe that 
the answer lies in the applicable defenses 
set up in the Code." (Footnote omitted.) 
The Court referred to the defenses of §§3-406 (70A-3-406, 
U.C.A. 1953), 4-406(4) (70A-4-406(4), U.C.A. 1953), and 
4-406(5) (70A4-406(5), U.C.A. 1953), and in connection with 
such defenses stated: 
"If the drawer is allowed in the pre-
sent case to sue the collecting bank, the 
assertion of the defenses, for all practi-
cal purposes, would be difficult. The 
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possibilities of such a result would tend 
to compel resorting to litigation in every 
case involving a forgery of commercial 
paper. It is a result to be avoided." 
Similarly, other counts of the plaintiff's complaint, for 
money had and received, for conversion, and for negligence 
were demurred to by the defendant, and the demurrer was 
sustained by the trial court. The Court on appeal affirmed 
the demurrer and in reference to the cause of the plain-
tiff "s loss, the Court stated "the harm which befell the 
plaintiff was the charging of its account by the drawee 
bank." 
The case of California Mill Sup. Corp. v. Bank 
of Am.N.T.&S. Association, 223 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1950), re-
flects the importance of the rule that a drawer of a check 
must proceed against the drawee-payor bank. The drawer of 
checks which it had issued upon the fraudulent representa-
tions of an employee brought an action against the defendant 
collecting bank which had cashed and endorsed the checks and 
collected thereon from the drawee bank, which in turn charged 
the checks to plaintiff's account. The drawer did not 
discover the fraud of its employee for more than a year 
after the payment of the last check. By such lapse of time, 
the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, 
and the drawer brought the action seeking to recover against 
the collecting bank. Citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
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San Francisco Bank, 136 P.2d 853 (Cal.App. 1943), the Court 
in California Mill held that a drawer had no right of direct 
action against the collecting bank upon the theory of an 
express, contractual obligation, upon the theory of conver-
sion, or upon the theory of money had and received. See 
also First National Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 14 A.2d 
765 (N.J. 1940) and Trojan Publishing Corp. v. Manufacturers 
Trust Co., 83 N.E.2d 465 (N.Y. 1948). 
The following cases support the rule that a drawer 
of a check cannot recover against a collecting bank since 
the collecting bank's warranties do not extend to the maker 
of the check, but only to subsequent transferees or holders: 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. San Francisco Bank, 136 P.2d 
853 (Cal.App. 1943); Railroad Bldg. Loan & Sav. Assn. v. 
Bankers Mortgage Co., 51 P.2d 61 (Kan. 1935); and First Na-
tional Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 14 A.2d 765 (N.J. 
1940). 
Continental cites Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Guaranty 
Bank & Trust Co., 370 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1966) as being "a 
fact situation very similar to the instant case." The 
Aetna Casualty case is very dissimilar to the instant case 
and the distinction reiterates the importance of the rule 
that a drawer must proceed against the drawee-payor bank, 
and not directly against depository or collecting banks. In 
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Aetna Casualty the office manager of the payee (not the 
drawer as stated in the Brief of Appellant, page 23), placed 
a rubber stamp endorsement on all checks received by and 
made payable to Sandler-Ette, the payee. The endorsement 
procedure was within the employee's duties as office mana-
ger. However, the checks were cashed by Guaranty Bank and 
the money delivered to the bank's employee. In this case, 
the payee does not have the contractual relationship that a 
drawer has to a drawee bank, but rather must seek its reme-
dies against the bank paying the check upon the unauthorized 
endorsement rather than to the actual payee or upon his 
genuine endorsement. Thus, the payee could seek its remedy 
against Guaranty Bank, the cashing bank. This situation is 
similar to Irvine v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. 311 
(1965). The facts are almost identical in that the trust 
company accepted certain checks made payable to the plain-
tiff for services rendered, but on which the plaintiff's 
name was forged. The Irvine court cited §3-419(1) (c) of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (§70A-3-419(1)(c), U.C.A. 1953) 
that "an instrument is converted when . . . it is paid on 
the forged endorsement." The Court then stated the rule 
concerning the payee's rights against a depositary bank: 
"To whom is the liability for the 
conversion? Not, presumably, to the 
drawer of the check for he is fully pro-
tected by his contract of deposit with 
the drawee bank. Liability for a conver-
sion is to the true owner of the check and 
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the true owner is the payee, or one claim-
ing under him. The true owner of the 
checks in this case is, of course, the 
plaintiff, the payee." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Irvine case distinguishes the drawer's remedies 
from the payee's remedies, and such must be done in the 
instant case because certain defenses against a drawer are 
known to and can only be raised by the drawee-payor bank. 
Another aspect of the Aetna Casualty case dis-
tinguishes it from the case at bar. The Court there held 
that each time the office manager cashed his employer's 
checks, the bank paid out its money and thereby suffered a 
loss. In the present case, the money paid out was that of 
Clark or the drawee bank, the latter of which may have had 
certain rights as against the depositary bank, subject to 
the defenses authorized by the Uniform Commercial Code, but 
there was no basis for the direct action by the drawer upon 
the depositary bank. 
4. The claim of Clark is precluded because a 
claim was not made upon Continental within one year from the 
time the bank statement and cancelled check was made avail-
able to Clark by its drawee banks. 
The Clark check was dated February 10, 1970, and 
processed through normal banking channels. Clark's action 
was not brought until April 23, 1971 (Ex. 1), more than one 
year after the check was processed and a statement and the 
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cancelled check provided to Clark. Clark's action is, 
therefore, precluded pursuant to Section 70A-4-406(4), 
quoted above. It is an absolute bar, "without regard to 
care or lack of care of either customer or the bank." 
5. Continental cannot recover upon a claim of 
breach of contract and the bond does not insure against 
breach of contract. 
The Clark/Service complaint included an allegation 
that Continental breached its contract with Clark. However, 
Continental's complaint against St. Paul does not allege 
that Clark and Service alleged breach of contract in their 
action against Continental. This points up Continental's 
complete disregard of the Clark/Service complaint. See 
Point II.B of this Brief. In addition, neither of the 
checks involved in this action were drawn on Continental. 
Any contract which Clark or Service had with Continental was 
in connection with a checking account with Continental, with 
checks drawable on such account. Both checks involved here 
were drawn on other banks, and Continental did not breach 
any contract as to them. 
Additionally, even if there were a breach of 
contract, the bond does not insure against breach of con-
tract, breach of trust, or negligence on the part of the 
bank. Continental assumes the bond insures against any loss 
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it suffers, without regard to the terms of the contract it 
has with St. Paul. St. Paul does not insure that Continental 
is an efficient, well-run bank. As to coverage of a banker's 
blanket bond, it has been said: 
11
 [I] t is not the intent of such bonds 
to insure against losses resulting from 
poor judgment, losses arising out of loans 
unless there is a forgery or dishonesty 
of employees, nor is it the purpose of 
such bonds to insure the bank's operation 
as a careful, well-managed bank." Fields, 
"Banker's Blanket Bonds: What They Cover 
and What They Do Not," 77 Banking Law 
Journal 1001 (1960). 
Any loss suffered by Continental, if from breach of con-
tract, is not a loss covered by the bond. 
In summary of this section, there can be no loss 
for which St. Paul is required to indemnify Continental 
where no facts would create a liability upon Continental. 
Since Continental was not liable to Clark or Service as a 
matter of law on the $32,500 and $10,272.22 checks, why then 
did Continental pay $15,600 to settle the Clark/Service 
complaint? Recall the Fifth Cause of Action thereof claimed 
$600,000 damages to Clark, the Bank's customer, on the 
theory that the Bank failed to advise Clark of Stoof's 
activities, thereby preventing Clark from learning of Stoof's 
total embezzlements from Clark of $600,000. Continental 
makes no claim that St. Paul was bound to indemnify or 
defend it as to that $600,000 claim, yet Continental now 
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claims that its "good faith" settlement of $15,600 must be 
applied solely to the Clark and Service claims for breach of 
contract or trust or negligence in Continental's handling of 
the two checks of $32,500 and $10,272.22. It is apparent 
that Continental's settlement was made to settle the $600,000 
damage claim and not to settle the claims on the two checks 
as to which it had no liability. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent St. Paul submits the trial court's ' 
judgment should be affirmed. The record clearly shows St. ( 
i 
Paul had no obligation to defend Continental in the Clark/ 
I 
Service actions because (1) the allegations of the Clark/ 
Service complaint did not allege loss or risks within the 
coverage of the bond, (2) Continental can show no facts ' 
within bond coverage which establish that Continental was or I 
i 
could have 'been liable to Clark or Service, and (3) Conti-
I 
nental, as a matter of law, had no liability to Clark or 
Service as to risks covered by the bond. 
The judgment should be affirmed and Respondent St. 1 
Paul should be awarded its costs. I 
i 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of November, 
I 
1975.
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